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MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 

Remarks upon the Memorial Address of Charles Francis Adams on the latb 
V AYiLLiAM II. Seward. 



THIRD PAPER 



DIFFERENCES existed in the Cabinet 
and the country in 1861 on some 
of the measures and tlie course of policy 
which the Government should pursue to- 
ward the secessionists. The questions 
presented were in some respects novel and 
without precedent, as was the insurrec- 
tion itself. Hostilities were precipitated 
within forty days uf the inauguration, be- 
fore the Aduiinistration was fully estab- 
lished in place, or had time to develop its 
policy. The assault on the flag at 
Charleston compelled immediate action. 
The proclamation promptly issued for 
seventy-five thousand volunteers also de- 
clared a blockade of the Southern ports. 
There was entire unanimity in the Cabi- 
net on all points in the proclamation ex- 
cept that of a blockade, which was ques- 
tioaed as a doubtful and irregular pro- 
ceeding; for the conflict, whether an 
insurrection or rebellion, was purely 
domestic — a civil war and not a foi-eign 
war; and it was thought the internal dis- 
sensions in our own territory should be 
confined within our own borders. A 
majority of the Cabinet, therefore, pre- 
ferred an embargo or suspension of inter- 
course with that part of the country to a 
blockade, and maintained it to be tiie true 
policy of the Government to close the 
ports and interdict commerce witii the 
insurgents until the rebellion was sup- 
pressed. It was claimed that a blockade 
was not a domestic but an internaticmal 
question — legitimate and proper as be- 
tween two distinct nations, but that we 
could not proi)erly blockade our own 
ports, though we miglit shut tliera up, 
prohil)it traffic from abroad hy law, and 
make its violation a criminal offence ; that 
the very fact of a blockade of the whole 
rebel territory would raise them to the 
level of belligerents — a concession to the 
Confederate organization virtually ad- 
mitting it to be a quasi government — 
giving that organization a position among 
nations that we would not and could not 
recognize or sanction, and which would 



inevitably lead to embari'assments. But 
the subject was in some of its aspects 
novel, and tlie Secretary of State, though 
sometimes rash, had not the bold and 
vigorous mind to assert and maintain a 
right princi])le if fraught with doubt and 
difficulty, provided tliere was an easier 
path. The blockade, he thought, opened 
up a way. The questions of blockade 
wei-e well settled and clearly defined, the 
authority and precedents explicit ; and he 
therefore preferred to adopt that course, 
shelter himself under those precedents, 
and apply international law to a strictly 
national and domestic controversy, rather 
tiian assert a measure and vindicate an 
important principle afi'ecting national 
rigiits. Less was said in the confusion 
and proceeding? which came like an 
avalanche at tliat critical moment upon 
the Administrati(m, than at a later pe- 
riod. Two members of the Cabinet said 
they had bestowed vei'y slight examina- 
tion upon the subject, and as it related to 
foreign intercjjurse they deferred to the 
Secretary of State, who had given it spe- 
cial attention, and also cited authorities 
justifying an exclusion of commerce from 
national ports in the equitable farm of 
blockade. President Lincoln inclined to 
that view, and when Mr. Seward asserted 
that one great object of the blockade in- 
stead of a closure of the ports was to avoid 
complications which would be likely to 
involve us in a foreign war, the question 
was decided. The President said we could 
not afford to have two wars on our hands 
at once, and a blockade was ordered. 
The authority and the rigiit of tiie na- 
tional Government to close ports witliin 
its jurisdiction was controverted by no one, 
though a blockade was. Mr. Seward 
himself, in his despatch of the 8th of June 
to Mr. Adams, said : " We claim to have 
a right to close the ports which have been 
seized by insui'rectionists for the purpose 
of suppressing the attempted revi)lution, 
and no one could justly complain if we 
had done so decisively and peremptorily." 



794 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



[Dec. 



But tlie English Government, as soon as 
iufurmation was obtained of diU'erences in 
the Anieri(3an Cabinet, made haste to 
force us to adhere to the blocl^ade, whicli 
would be aa acknowledgment of bellig- 
erent rights to the rebels, by indirectly 
admonishing us of its views and inten- 
tions in a debate promptly got up in 
Parliament for the purpose on the 27th 
of June, immediately on thereceipt of Mr. 
Seward's despatch. Lord John Russell 
in that debate announced the interpola- 
tion of a new doctrine b^^ the British (Jov- 
ernment into international law, by declar- 
ing to the feeble government of New 
Granada, " It is not competent for its 
government to close its ports that are de 
facto in possession of the insurgents." 

The debate, ostensibly on the aflairs of 
New Granada, was evidently and unmis- 
takably intended as an admonition and 
menace to the United States, then en- 
gaged in suppressing insurrection. In a 
despatch of the 28th of June from our 
Minister in London, just twenty days after 
Mr. Seward's despatch of the 8th of 
June claiming our right to close the 
ports, jMr. Adams wrote the Secre- 
tary of State that in an interview with 
Lord John Russell, " His Lordship tlien 
said something about difficulties in New 
Granada, and the intelligence that the 
insurgents had undertaken to close sev- 
eral of their ports. But the law officers 
here told him that this could not be done 
as against foreign nations, excepting l)y 
the regular form of blockade. lie did 
not know what we thought about it, but 
he had observed that some such plan was 
likely to be adopted at the coming ses- 
sion of Congress in regard to the ports of 
those whom we considered as insurgents." 
llis lordship also on the 27th of June an- 
nounced in Parliament that '' the opinion 
of Iler Majesty's Government after taking 
legal advice is, that it is perfectly compe- 
tent for the government of a c(nintry in a 
state of tranquillity to say which ports 
shall be open to trade and which shall be 
closed ; but in the event of insurrection 
or civil war in that country, it is not com- 
petent for its government to close its ports 
that are de facto in the hands of the in- 
surgents, as that would be an invasion 
of international law with regard to block- 
ade." 

Congress when it convened in spe- 
cial session in July, a few days after this 
English menace, totally unmindful of " the 



opinion of Her Majesty's Government after 
taking legal advice," imt under the counsel 
and deliberate conclusion of our wisest and 
ablest legislators and statesmen, and in 
total disregard of the policy of our own 
Secretary of State as well as of Her Ma- 
jesty's Government, declined to commit 
itself to the blockade, and in explicit and 
emphatic language authorized, Ijy the act 
of the 13th of July, a closure of the ports. 
^Ir. Seward was constrained, under these 
circumstances and under the direction of 
President Lincoln, on the 2Ist of July, to 
tell Mr. Adams that " Since your con- 
versation with Lord John Russell, the 
Congress of the United States has by law 
asserted the right of this Government to 
close the ports of this country which 
have been seized by the insurgents. The 
connecting by Lord John Russell of that 
measure when it Avas in prospect with 
what had taken place in regard to a law 
of New Granada, gives to the ren)arks 
which he made to you a significance that 
requires no especial illustration. The 
President fully agrees with Congress in 
the principle of the law which authorizes 
him to close the ports which have been 
seized by the insurgents, and lie will put 
into execution and maintain it with all 
the means at his command, at the hazard 
of whatever consequences, whenever it 
shall appear that the safety of the nation 
requires it." 

It is not expedient, perhaps, to follow 
up in its details a subject not particular- 
ly ci'editable to our diplomacy and to the 
maintenance of our national rights, further 
than to allude briefly to the historic facts. 
The brave words of the Secretary of State, 
uttered on the 2Ist of July, were not en- 
forced. Mr. Adam,^, in a despatch of the 
16th of August, says he took occasion to 
intimate to Lord John Russell that " he 
must not infer from my not having enter- 
ed into discussion of the merits of the 
question, that I gave any assent to the \>o- 
sition taken by him about the right of a 
government to close its own ports, when 
held by forcible possession of persons re- 
sisting its authority. On the contrary, 1 
desired to reserve for my government the 
treatment of it as an open question when- 
ever it should take any practical shape. 
In the mean time I had every reason to be- 
lieve that it was the design of the Presi- 
dent to persevere in the blockade," etc. 
His lordship declared in Parliament, how- 
ever, that he considered the law of Con- 



1873.] 



MR. LINCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. 



795 



gress " as merely giving a discretionary 
power. But if carried into practice, lie 
construed it as putting an end to tlie 
blockade." Under these threats our (Jov- 
ernnient tamely submitted. The law of 
Congress was not carried into effect, our 
diplomacy was meek and yielding, and 
under British menace the blockade of our 
own ports, by our own shii)s, was contin- 
ued . 

On the 2d of September the Secretary 
of .State, with some trepidation, informed 
the Minister that "no change of i)olicy 
in regard to the blockade has been ad()i)t- 
ed " — a timid intimation of acquiescence 
in an insult and injury, to appease British 
arrogance ; her ministry believing and as- 
serting that an effective blockade of our 
extensive coast was impo.ssible, but in no 
other way could commerce be interdicted. 
Our Government did not close the ports, 
but under the hint given by the English 
dictum to New Granada, it abstained from 
exercising the national authority, and was 
passive and submissive. In all this time, 
while treating the Confederates as bel- 
ligerents, and their organization as a quasi 
government, the Secretary of State, with 
strange inconsistency, denounced their 
cruisers as pirate-s. 

Not until the 9th of April, 1865, after 
Richmond had fallen, and only three days 
before the assassination of President Lin- 
coln, was a proclamation issued, in pursu- 
ance of the act of Congress of the 13th of 
July, 1861, to close the ports of the South- 
ern States. Until the war had virtually 
ceased, tiie law of Congress was not en- 
forced. The British mandate to New Gra- 
nada was tamely acquiesced in and ob- 
.sequiously observed by the United States. 
Our ports were not closed, but block- 
aded, which eventuated, as was intended, 
in establishing throughout the war the 
Engli.sh ports of Nassau, Bermuda, and 
Halifax as entrepots for illicit traffic with 
the rebels and resorts for rebel crui.sers, 
to harass and destroy our counnerce. It 
0])ened the English ports throughout tlie 
world to the Alabania, and rovers of her 
class, Avhich swept our merchant ships 
from the ocean for the benefit of England. 

On the subject of a blockade of our own 
ports by our own vessels, Mr. Seward had 
undoubtedly, for good or for evil, influ- 
ence Avith the President which outweigh- 
ed a majoritj' of the Cabinet and Con- 
gress. The suliject was new to him when 
hl^ decision was given, and the blockade 



being made eflective by the navy, lie did 
not care to reopen a disturbing question, 
though his views became modified, and 
ultimately the ports were closed, notwith- 
standing the Enijlish dictum to New Gra- 
nada. 

Tlie management of our foreign affairs, 
and the maintenance of our rights against 
the jiretensioiis and menaces of the arro- 
gant ministry of England, thus com- 
menced, was continued, until intelligent 
Englishmen themselves were surprised if 
not disgusted with our subserviency- 
After the shameful renunciation of our 
right to send into the courts mails from 
cajitured vessels — a right recognized and 
established by the usage of nations, and 
made a duty by our own statutes — an 
eminent English publicist, Sir Vernon 
Ilawksworth, amazed at our submissive 
and pusillanimous diplomacy, Marned liis 
government against proceeding too fiir in 
its demands, " for," said he, '■'what we 
have Jiiost to fear is not that Americaiis 
will yield too little, but that we shall accept 
too much.'''' A humiliating commentary 
on our dii)l()macy, by an English writer of 
no mean aliility. 

The relation of the circumstances at- 
tending the capture and release of the 
rebel emissaries. Mason and Slidell, is 
pregnant with error. The excitement 
which accompanied the intelligence of the 
capture of these mischievous men was 
great, and had at one time a threatening 
aspect. The final disposition of the ques- 
ticm, with the restoration of the prisoners 
to British authority, might well be men- 
tioned as displaying the marked and in 
some respects perhaps happy trait of Mr. 
Seward in adapting himself to circum- 
stances which he could not control. But 
Mr. Adams fails to bring out that shrewd 
diplomatic quality of Mr. Seward's mind, 
and strives to inculcate an impression 
that tlie Secretary of State stood alone ; 
was wise, sagacious, reserved, and pro- 
found, when others were blind, precip- 
itate, and weak ; took upon himself" the 
whole weight of popular indigiration," 
and, " like the Roman Curtius, who leap- 
ed into the abyss which could have been 
closed in no other way," he offered him- 
self a sacrifice to secure the safiity of the 
State. Mr. Seward should receive credit 
for the dexterous and skilful despatch 
which he jH-epared on hJ.s own change of 
position. It exhibits his readiness and 
peculiar tact and ability to extricate liim 



796 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



[Dec, 



self from and to pass over difficulties. 
But in point of fact no man was more 
elated or jubilant over the capture of the 
emissaries than Mr. Seward, who fur a 
time made no attempt to conceal his grat- 
ification and approval of • the- act of 
Wilkes. But while he and most of the 
Cabinet and country were hilarious, the 
President had doubts, misgivings, and re- 
grets, which were increased after an in- 
terview with Senator Sumner, with whom 
he often— sometimes to the disgust and 
annoyance of Mr. Seward — advised on 
controverted or disputed international 
questions, and especially when there were 
differences between himself and the Sec- 
retary of State. 

On the question of giving up the emis- 
saries, Mr. Adams says: "When the 
time came for the assembly of the Cabi- 
net, not a sign had been given by the 
President, or any of the members, favora- 
ble to concession. Mr. Seward, who had 
been charged with the official duty of fur- 
nishing tlie expected answer, assumed the 
responsibility of preparing his able argu- 
ment, upon which a decision was made to 
surrender the men. Upon him would 
have rested the whole weight of popular 
indignation had it proved formidable. If 
I have I)een rightly informed, when read 
it met with few comments and less appro- 
bation. On the other hand, there was no 
resistance. Silence gave consent. It was 
the act of Mr. Seward, and his name was 
to be associated with it, whether for good 
or for evil." 

The truth is, not only had the Presi- 
dent expressed his doubts of the legality 
of the capture, and had them increased, 
while ]\Ir. Seward was rejoicing over and 
approving of the proceeding, but Mr. 
Bhiir from the first had denounced the 
act as unauthorized, irregular, and ille- 
gal. Not being a special admirer of 
Wilkes, Mr. Blair recommended that 
Wilkes should be ordered to take the Iro- 
quois and go with Mason and Slidell to 
England, and deliver them to the British 
government ; for Palmerston and Russell 
would, he said, seiz;e the occasion to make 
war, Tlie prompt and voluntary disa- 
vowal of the act of Wilkes, and delivering 
over the prisoners, would have evinced 
our confidence in our own power, and been 
a manifestation of our indifference and 
contempt for the emissaries, and a rebuke 
to the alleged intrigues between the reb- 
els and the English Cabinet. Mr. Sew- 



ard took a totally different view ; scouted 
the idea of letting the prisoners go ; said 
the British did not want them, and we 
could not think of delivering them up. 
While Mr. Blair did not go about at the 
time proclaiuiing his opinions on a sub- 
ject which was under consideration, liLs 
dissent from the original views of the Sec- 
retary of State, and condemnation of the 
act of Wilkes, are notorious among those 
who were intimate with the transactions 
of the Government. The time for further 
withholding the facts, and permitting men 
like Mr. Adams to be misled, has gone by. 
The truth in relation to these and other 
matters, so long perverted and suppress- 
ed, should be known, and history set 
right. 

Nearly every member of the Adminis- 
tration, like Mr. Seward, rejoiced in the 
capture of these mischievous men. No 
one coincided with Mr. Blair in his sug- 
gestion to compel Wilkes to return them 
to the custody of Great Britain, however 
wise it may have been in view of subse- 
quent events. But the irregular action 
of Wilkes in this case was in various ways 
the cause of serious embarrassment. If 
the proceedings could not be fully justified, 
neither could they, in the then condition 
of affairs, and the excited state of pul)lic 
feeling, be censured and condemned. 
But the Secretary of the Navy, before 
hearing from Great Britain, before even 
the Administration had passed upon the 
subject, was compelled to recognize and 
approve or disapprove the act, and com- 
municate the, transaction in his annual 
navy report, just then to be submitted to 
the President and Congress. In that re- 
port, and in a congratulatory letter of the 
30th of November, allusion is made to the 
irregularity of Wilkes, which, it is sug- 
gested, might be excu.sed in view of the 
patriotic motives ; " but it must by no 
means be permitted to constitute a prece- 
dent hereafter for the treatment of any 
similar infraction of neutral obligations 
by foreign vessels engaged in commerce 
or the carrying trade," This report, 
though bearing date of the 2d of Decem- 
ber, the day on which Congress convened, 
was, as is usual with annual reports, de- 
livered complete to the President at the 
last regular Cabinet meeting preceding 
the session, which was on Friday, the 
29th of November, 1861, to be transmitteof 
with the message. Of course the naval 
report was seen ou that day by Mr. Sew- 



1873.] 



MR. LTXCOLX AND i\IR. SEWARD. 



797 



ard, who until then had taken no excep- 
tion to the capture ; but on tlie succeeding 
day, the 30th of Noveuiber, tlie date of 
the congratulatory letter to Wilkes, lie 
wrote to Mr. Adams what the latter gen- 
tleman calls the " preliminary despatch 
that saved the dignity of" the country." 

These matters, it will l)e borne in mind, 
were weeks before hearing from England, 
and before ]\Ir. Seward's elaborate answer 
of the 2Gth of December to the demand 
of the British government for the surren- 
der of the emissaries. When Mr. Adams 
declares tiiat " not a sign had been given 
l)y the President or any member of the 
Cabinet favorable to concession," at the 
time that answer was prepared, he com- 
mits an egregious mistake. The Presi- 
dent was from tiie first willing to make 
concession. Mr. Blair advocated it. JNIr. 
Seward was at the beginning opposed to 
any idea of concession which involved 
giving up the emissaries, but yielded at 
once, and with dexterity, to the peremp- 
tory demand of Great Britain. Let him 
have all the applause which belongs to 
him for the facility and diplomatic skill 
which hedisplaj'ed in that change, but in 
doing so it is unjust to the President and 
others to misrepresent them, or to mis- 
take or jiervert the facts in regard to them 
or Mr. Seward. 

The incidents selected from among 
many indicate something of the man- 
aging expediency, fertility of resources, 
and administrative manner of Mr. Sew- 
ard, and illustrate the "superior intel- 
lectual power " and " force of moral dis- 
cii)line " which the" Memorial Address " 
undertakes to say enabled liira to " di- 
rect affairs for the benefit of the naticm, 
through the name of another." Acting 
at times from impulse, often without 
sufficient forethought of consequences — • 
fond of displaying power — frequently ex- 
ercising questionable authority — prompt- 
ed in some degree by Jol)bing and lobby 
surroundings which, fostered at Albany 
and defeated at Ciiicago, followed him to 
AVashington, where not a few of those fol- 
lowers contrived to grow rich as tlie coun- 
try grew poor, Mr. Seward attempted and 
did many things which could scarcely be 
justified, but forwhich tiie Administration 
was responsible. It would be unjust to 
tJirow his eccentricities and errors upon 
others, and award to him the honors and 
credit of successful measures of adminis- 
tration which he did not originate. 



The President, never unreasonably ob- 
stinate or wilful, was ever lenient and 
forbearing, even when his intentions were 
defeated, and sometimes yielded to pro- 
ceedings that his judgment did not fully 
approve. In the generosity of his nature 
he was tolerant of acts where a more ar- 
bitrary and imperious mind would have 
been implacable and unforgiving. There 
were occasi(ms, however, when, relying 
on his own convictions, and the exi- 
gency being great, he exercised the ex- 
ecutive will — the one-man power — with 
intelligent determination and effect. His 
promjjtness and energy in an emergency 
were displayed on one memorable occasion, 
when danger was imminent and innuedi- 
ate decision necessary. It may be men- 
tioned as illustrative of his executive abil- 
ity, promptness, and self-reliance ; for it 
was in the absence of Mr. Seward, and 
when those on Avhom he had a right to 
rely failed him and were despondent. 
Gloom and national disaster were upon 
the country, but the President met the 
crisis with firntness, rose with the exi- 
gency, and, independent of his Caliinet and 
against the general sentiment of tiie peo- 
ple, and by a sacrifice of personal feeling, 
adopted a course which results justified, 
and proved his ability as chief. 

In the early period of the war the pro- 
ceedings and operations of the military 
commanders were unsatisfactory, and no- 
where equalled the general expectation. 
Too much was doubtless expected and too 
little accomplished. None were more dis- 
appointed or depressed by the slow pro- 
gress made than the President himself. 
For a period he had hopes fromMcClellan, 
Avhose talents at organization were dis- 
played to advantage when, in the summer 
of 1861, he took command at Washington, 
established order, and enforced good mili- 
tary administration. In some respect 
the President esteemed him to be superior 
to any of the generals with whom he had 
come in contact ; but tlie afltumn wore 
away in dilatory parades. With the 
change in the War Department in Janu- 
ary, 18G2, came the hostility of Secretary 
Stanton to jNIcClellan, then General-in- 
Chief. The hesitating movements of that 
officer weakened tli« confidence of the 
President in his energy and military 
power. He still believed, however, that 
the Genei-al had superior military capa- 
city and intelligence, but that he was in-" 
ert, infirm of purpose ; not quite realy to 



"98 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



[Dec 



do all that lieliad the ability to accomplish. 
lie rcixiiired pushing, and the President 
therefore took upon himself to order a for- 
ward movement of both the army and 
navy. But JMcClellan continued tardy, 
and the winter and spring delays, follow- 
ed by the sluggish movements on the York 
peninsula and the reverses before Rich- 
mond, discouraged and greatly dishearten- 
ed not only the President but the whole 
country. At this juncture, when, with 
large armies under him, he had more than 
he C(nild perform in the line of his profes- 
sion, McClellan in July wrote from his 
headquarters a very injudicious, not to 
say impertinent letter to the President in 
relation to the civil administration and 
the political conduct of affairs. This un- 
wise letter, ami the reverses of the army, 
with the active hostility of Stanton, 
brought Halleck,a vastly inferior man, to 
Washington. General Pope had preced- 
ed him, and, l)y an executive order creat- 
ing the army of Virginia, had been placed 
in command of that army, then in front of 
Washington, to the infinite disgust of some 
of tlie older generals. This disgust was 
increased by his public gasconading pro- 
clamation reflecting on the proceedings of 
his seniors — on their" lines of retreat and 
bases of supplies," which must, he said, 
thenceforward be discarded. These bla- 
tant bulletins, instead of inspiriting the 
men, caused ridicule in the ranks. The 
soldiers were attached to their old officers, 
particularly to McClellan, and to a great 
extent sympathized with him and other 
generals in their dislike, almost contempt, 
of this junior commander. Pope had 
been brouglit from the West directly after 
Halleck reported he had accomplished ex- 
traordinary achievements — reporis gross- 
ly untrue, and which Pope himself after- 
ward refuted. On coming to Washing- 
t(|fi. Pope, who was ardent, and I think 
courageous, though not always discreet, 
very naturally fell into the views of Sec- 
retary Stanton, who improved every op- 
portunity to denounce McClellan and his 
hesitating policy. Pope also reciprocat- 
ed the C(jminendations bestowed on him 
by Halleck, by uniting Avitli Stanton and 
General Scott in advising that McClellan 
should be superseded, and Halleck placed 
in charge of military affairs at Washing- 
ton. This, combined with the movements 
and the disasters before Ricinnond, en- 
abled Stanton to get rid of McClellan at 
headquarters. One of the lirst orders of 



Halleck on reaching Washington aftei 
superseding McClellan, was for the with, 
drawal of the army of the Potomac from 
the vicinity of Richmond. This brought 
McClellan and his generals with their 
commands to the assistance of Pope, for 
whom they not only entertained no special 
regard, but some of them absolute hate. 
The orders to reinforce and assist Pope 
were consequently not obeyed with alac- 
rity. There is no denying the fact that 
professional pride was allowed to encroach 
on patriotic duty in that momentous pe- 
riod. The selection of Pope to command 
that army may have been injudicious ; he 
may not have been the man to take in 
hand and wield the immense force which 
met Lee and Jackson at the front ; there 
may have been error on the part of Stanton 
and Halleck as well as Pope in slighting 
some of the older generals ; the enmity of 
the Secretary of War toward McClellan 
may not witiiout reason have been felt by 
him and his favorites as unjust; yet the 
Avellare of the republic should not have 
been put in jeopardy to gratify personal, 
official, or professional resentments. The 
general in counnand, whether j^oung or 
old, should at such a crisis have been ear- 
nestly and in good faith sustained. Had 
that been the case, the results of the second 
battle at Manassas or Bull Run might have 
been different. But Pope was defeated, and 
the army, sadly demoralized, came retreat- 
ing to the Potomac. The War Depart- 
ment, and especially Stanton and Ualleck, 
became greatly alarmed. On the 30th of 
August, in the midst of these disasters 
and before the result had reached us, 
though most damaging information in re- 
gard to McClellan, who lingered at Alex- 
andria, was current, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Mr. Chase, called upon me with 
a protest, signed by himself ami Stanton, 
denouncing the conduct of McClellan and 
demanding his immediate dismissal. Two 
other members were ready to append their 
names after mine. I declined to sign the 
paper, which was in the handwriting of 
Stanton, not that I did not disapprove of 
the course of the General, but because the 
combination was improper and disrespect- 
ful to the President, who had selected his 
Cabinet to consult and advise with, not to 
conspire against him ; besides, some of 
the charges or allusions in the paper I 
knew nothing of, and I had doubted the 
Avisdoin of recalling the army of the Po- 
tomac from Richmond, therein differing 



1873.] 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



iOO 



from Chase and Stanton. The object in 
bringing that army back to W'asiiington 
in order to start anew, marcli overland, 
and regain the abandoned position, I did 
not mideiistand unless it was to get rid of" 
McCleUan ; and it' that was the object it 
■would iiave been mucli better to phice an- 
other general at the liead of tlie army 
while it was yet on the James. But a 
majority of the Cabinet finally united in 
this proceeding, and on Monday, the 1st 
of September, the paper, somewhat mod- 
ified and signed by four of the Cabinet 
officers, was brought me. Mr. Seward 
was at the time absent from Wash- 
ington — I never doubted jturposely ab- 
sent — and not of the numljer. My re- 
fusal and perhaps my remarks prevented 
the matter from proceeding further. The 
indignation against McCleUan was at the 
time intense in Wasliington and the coun- 
try. The President never knew of this 
paper, l)ut was not unaware of the popu- 
lar feeling, in which he sympathized, and 
of the sentiments of tlie members of the 
Cabinet, aggravated by the hostility and 
strong if not exaggerated rumors sent out 
by the Secretary of War. Both Stanton 
and Halleck were, however, filled with 
apprehensions beyond others, as the army 
of stragglers and broken battalions on 
the last of August and first of September 
came rusliing toward Wasliington. 

At tlie stated Cabinet meeting on Tues- 
day, the 2d of September, while the 
whole community was stirred up and in 
confusion, and afi'airs were gloomy beyond 
anytliing tiiat had previously occurred, 
Stanton entered the council room a few 
moments in advance of Mr. Lincoln and 
said, with great excitement, he had just 
learned from General Halleck that the 
President had placed McCleUan in com- 
mand of the forces in Washington. The 
information was surprising, and, in view 
of the prevailing excitement against that 
officer, alarming. The President soon 
came in, and in answer to an inquiry 
from Mr. Chase, confirmed what Stanton 
had stated. General regret was expi'ess- 
ed, and Stanton witli some feeling re- 
marked that no order to that effect had 
issued from the War Department. The 
President, calml}' but with some emphasis, 
said the order was liis, and he would be 
responsible for it to tlie country. With a 
retreating and demoralized army tumbling 
in upon us, and alarm ami panic in the 
community, it was neces.sary,thePresident 



.said, that something should be done, but 
there seemed to be no one to do it. lie 
therefore had directed McCleUan, who 
knew this whole ground, who was the 
best organizer in the army, whose faculty 
was to organize and defend, and who 
would here act upon the defensive, to 
take this defeated and broken army and 
reorganize it. lie knew full well the in- 
firmities of McCleUan, who was not an af- 
firmative man ; was worth little tor an on- 
ward movement; but beyond any other of- 
ficer he had the confidence of the armj', 
and he could more efficiently and speed- 
ily reoi'ganize it and jiut it in eoiuli- 
tion than any other general. If the Sec- 
I'etary of War, or any member of the Cab- 
inet, would name a general that could do 
this as promjjtly and well, he would ap- 
point iiim. For an active fighting gen- 
eral he was sorry to say JMcClellan was a 
failure; he had" the slows " ; was never 
ready for battle, and probably never would 
be ; but for this exigency, when organiza- 
tion and defence were needed, he consid- 
ered him the best man for the service, and 
the country must have the benefits of his 
talents though he had behaved l3adl3\ 
The President said he iiad seen and given 
his opinion to General Halleck, w!io was 
still General-in-Chief; but Halleck had 
no plan or views of his own, proposed to 
do nothing himself, and fully approved 
his calling upon INIeClellan. 

In stating what he had done the Presi- 
dent was deliberate, but firm and decisive. 
His language and manner Avere kind and 
affectionate, especially toward two of the 
members, who were greatly disturbed ; but 
every person present felt that he was truly 
the chief, and everyone knew his decision 
was as fixed and unalterable as if given 
out with tiie imperious command and de- 
termined will of Andrew Jackson. A 
long discussion followed, closing with 
acquiescence in the decision of the Presi- 
dent, ))ut l)ef(n'e separating, the Secretary 
of the Treasury expressed his apprehen- 
sion that the reinstatement of McCleUan 
would prove a national calamity. 

In this instance the President, unaided 
by others, put forth with firmness and de- 
termination tlie executive will — the one- 
man power — against the temporary gen- 
eral sense of the community as well as of 
his Cabinet, two of whom it has been gen- 
erally supposed had with him an influ- 
ence almost as great as the Secretary of 
State. Tliey had been ready to make 



800 



MR. LIXCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. 



[Dec. 



issue and resign their places unless Mc- 
Cleilan was dismissed ; but knowing their 
opposition, and in spite of it and of the 
general dissatisfaction in the community, 
the President had in that perilous mo- 
ment exalted him to new and impm'tant 
trusts. In an interview with the Presi- 
dent on the succeeding Friday, when only 
he and myself were present, he un- 
burthened liis mind freely. Military mat- 
ters were still in confusion, without plan 
or purpose at headquarters. The Secre- 
tary of War, under Pope's defeat and jMc- 
Clellan's reinstatement, was not only dis- 
appointed, but dejected and dispirited. 
The President said most of our troubles 
grew out of military jealousies. Whether 
changing the plan of operations (dis- 
carding McClellan and placing Pope in 
command) was wise or not, was not now 
the matter in hand. These things, right 
or wrong, had been done. If the Admin- 
istration had erred, the country should not 
have been made to suffer and our brave 
men cut down and butchered. Pope 
should have been sustained, but he was 
not. These personal and professional 
quarrels came in. Whatever may have 
been said to the contrary, it could not be 
denied that the army was with JNIcClellan. 
He had so skilfully handled his troops 
in not getting to Richmond as to retain 
their confidence. The soldiers certainly 
had not transferred their confidence to 
Pope. He could, however, do no more 
good in this quarter. It was humiliating, 
after what had transpired and all we knew, 
to reward McClellan and those who failed 
to do their whole duty in the hour of trial, 
but so it was. Personal considerations 
must be sacrificed for the public good. He 
had kept aloof from the dissensions tliat 
prevailed, and intended to; " but," said 
he, " I must have McClellan to reorganize 
the army and bring it out of chaos. There 
has been a design, a purpose in breaking 
down Pope, without regard to the conse- 
quences to the country, that is atrocious. 
It is shocking to see and know this, but 
there is no remedy at present. McClellan . 
has the army with him." These were the 
views and this the course of the President 
when there was general dismay in the 
country and confusion in the army, the 
rebels near the intrenchments of Wash- 
ington, and some of the Cabinet alarmed 
and preparing to leave. The President 
was not insensible to the deficiencies or 
ignorant of the faults of McClellan, nor 



yet blind to and stubborn as regarded his 
better qualities. In placing liiui at the 
head of the army he went counter to the 
wishes of his friends, and forgetful of all 
else he subdued every personal feeling, 
and in the spirit of unselfish patriot- 
ism resolved to do what was for the 
true interest of the country. Had the 
General followed up the battle of Antie- 
tam, which took place a fortnight later, 
he would have retrieved the misfortunes 
of the peninsula and given the President 
additional reason to congratulate himself 
on the reinstateu'ent ; but the old dilatory 
infirmity remained, which strengthened 
the influence that persistently o})posed 
him, and led to his being retired from the 
command of the army. 

The President was a much more shrewd 
and accurateobserver of the characteristics 
of men — better and more correctly formed 
an estimate of their power and capabili- 
ties — than the Secretary of State or most 
others. Those in the public service he 
closely scanned, but wasdeliberate in form- 
ing a conclusion adverse to any one he had 
appointed. In giving or withdrawing 
confidence he was discriminating and 
just in his final decision ; careful never 
to wound unnecessarily tlie sensibilities 
of any for their infirmities, always ready 
to praise, but nevertheless firm and reso- 
lute in discharging the to liim always 
pain fid duty of censure, reproof, or dis- 
missal. 

Du Pont he classed in the naval service 
with McClellan in the military. Both 
were intelligent, accomplished, and val- 
ual)le officers in tlieir way, but neither 
was the man for fierce encounter and des- 
perate fighting. Tlie two until tried had 
his support and all the confidence to 
which they wereentitled, or which either 
had reason to expect, If the results at 
Port Royal were not followed up with the 
energy and vigor anticipated, the fault 
was, he justly considered, as much with 
the military as with the navy. But in 
the autumn of 1862 and winter of 1863 
extensive preparations were made for re- 
taking Fort Sumter and the capture of 
Charleston. Du Pont visited Washington 
in the autumn, and had consulted on the 
subject, but would listen to no sugges- 
tiim that any other officer should be de- 
tailed for that especial service, Avhich he 
claimed as a right and as within the 
limits of his blockade. Exti-aordinary ef- 
forts were accordingly mn,de by the Navy 



1873.] 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



801 



Deiiartraent, which gave hi:ii a hirge 
portion of the best officers and vessels in 
the service that he might be successful. 
But time wore on, with no more effective 
demonstration than liad been made by the 
army of the Pi^tomac on the York penin- 
sula. Du Pont, like McClellan, was con- 
stantly asking for more reinforcements, 
and tlie Navy Department strained every 
nerve to aid him, and often answered liis 
requisitions at the expense of other squad- 
rons. 

The President, as well as the wliole 
countrj', felt greatly interested in this 
subject; not that (Jliarleston was of any 
great strategic importance, l)ut it was the 
liotbed of secession, and tliere the rebel- 
lion had its origin. It was winter or early 
spring, and nothing had been accomplish- 
ed, when the President one day said to me 
that he had but slight expectation that 
we should have any great success from 
Du Pont. " lie. as well as McClellan," 
said ^Ir. Lincoln, " hesitates — lias ' the 
slows.' McClellan always wanted more 
regiments ; Du Pont is everhistingly ask- 
ing for more gunboats — more ironclads. 
He will do nothing with any. He has in- 
telligence and system, and will maintain a 
good blockade. You did well in select- 
ing him for that command, but he will 
never take Sumter or get to Charleston. 
He is no Farragut, though unquestion- 
ably a good routine officer, who obeys 
orders and in a general way carries out 
his instructions." A few weeks served to 
verify all that the President had said on 
the subject. Du Pont died without plant- 
ing thefiag on Sumter or visiting Charles- 
ton. 

The distinctive measure of Mr. Lin- 
coln's administration, beyond all others 
that which makes it an era in our na- 
tional history, is tlie deci'ee of emancipa- 
tion. This movement, almost revolution- 
ary, was a step not anticipated by him 
when elected, and which neither he nor 
any of his Cabinet were prepared for or 
would have assented to when they enter- 
ed upon their duties. He and tliey had, 
regardless of party discipline, resisted the 
schemes for the extension of slavery into 
free territory under the sanction of fed- 
eral authority. All of them, though of 
different parties, were and ever had been 
opposed to slavery, but not one of them 
favored any interference with it by the 
national Government in the States where 
it was established or permitted. The as- 



sumption, after the acquisition of territory 
from ^Mexico, that slavery was a national 
and not a local institution, opened a new 
controversy in American politics, which 
contributed to tiie disintegration of old 
party organizations, each of which be- 
came in a measure sectional. Tlie dis- 
senting elements resisted the centralizing 
claim that slaver^' was national, not local ; 
and ultimately, after a struggle of sev- 
eral years, they threw off old i)arty alle- 
giance and combined under a new organi- 
zation, thenceforward known as Republi- 
can. In the first stages of this move- 
ment neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Seward 
participated. Both of them had sympa- 
thized with what was known as the Free- 
soil party in 1818, but declined to become 
identified with it. They were politi- 
cians, and not then prepared to abandon 
the organization with which they had 
previously acted. Mr. Lincoln, with the 
free thought and independence of the men 
of the West, less trained and bound to 
party than the disciplined i)oliticians in 
the old States, holding no official posi- 
tion, a quiet but observing and reflect- 
ing citizen, truthful, honest, faithful to 
his convictions, and with the mental 
strength and courage to avow and main- 
tain them, early appreciated the import- 
ant principles involved in this rising ques- 
tion, and boldly cast off the shackles of 
party in defence of the right, and ear- 
nestly, irrespective of any and all par- 
ties, opposed the extension and aggres- 
sions of slavery. Mr. Seward was in 
those days in office, trammelled by jiarty 
followers and party surroundings. Train- 
ed during his whole public career in the 
severest discipline of party, indebted to 
it for his high position, alw^iys subservi- 
ent to its decrees and requirements, active 
and exacting in enforcing its obligations, 
he had not the independence and moral 
stamina to free himself from the restraints 
and despotism of party, whatever were 
his sympathies, until that organization 
dislianded. The people of the West, who 
knew Mr. Lincoln and ai)preciatcd his 
capabilities, trieil in 18.56 to place him on 
the ticket with Fremont as a candidate 
for Vice-President. Although but slight- 
ly known in the East, such was the zeal 
and enthusiasm in his favor of those who 
knew him, that nothing but tlie expedi- 
ency of selecting an Eastern man to be 
associated with Fremont, who was from 
the West, prevented his nomination iu- 



802 MR. LIXCOLX AND MR. SEWAIID. [Dec 

stead of Daj- ton. From the start he was that there was in the inensiire profound 
a prominent Republican champion and thought, statesmanship, courage, and far- 
leader, while JNIr. Seward, a partisan pol- seeing sagacity — consummate executive- 
itician, held off; was i-eluctant to leave and administrative ability, Avhich was, 
tlie party with which he had been asso- after some reverses, crowned with suc- 
ciated, lioping to make the new move- cess. The nation, emerging from gloom 
ment subservient to or a part of the Whig and disaster, and the whole civilized 
party. Mr. Lincoln had no such purpose ; world', united in awarding honor and grat- 
the principles involved were with him itude to the illustrious man who had the 
ab;)ve mere party. With no fortune, un- mind to conceive and the courage and 
aided by metropolitan funds or pecuniary firmness to decree the emancii)atii)n of a 
assistance from any quarter, he gave his race. Ten years after this event, when 
time and mind with unstinted devotion to the patriot and philanthropist who de- 
the cause of freedom, and in his memora- creed emancipation had been years in his 
ble campaign with Douglas, alone and grave, an attempt is made on a solemn 
unassisted, he, through the empire State occasion to award to one of his subordi- 
of the West, met the Senatorial giant* on nates the honor and credit which justly 
the questions of the extensi(m of slavery, belong to the great chief who decreed it. 



the rights of the States, the grants to and 
limitatioyi of the powers of the General 
Government, and displayed ability and 
power which won the applause of the 
country, and drew from Douglas himself 
expressions of profound respect. 

When the Republicans, in convention at 
Chicago, chose their standard-bearer, they 
wisely and properly selected as their rep- 
resentative the sincere and able man avIio 
had no great money power in his interest, 
no disciplined lobby, no host of party fol- 
lowers, but who, like David, confided in 
the justice of his cause, and with the sim- 
ple weapons of truth and right met the 
Goliath of slavery aggi-ession, before as- 
sembled multitudes, in many a Avell-con- 
tested debate. The popular voice was not 



The Albany "Memorial Address" dwells 
on public measures, particularly during 
the war, but makes no allusion to this great 
act of Lincoln, nor to his merits in the 
great cause of freedom, for which he la- 
bored and in which he died, but declares 
his Secretary of State, a lifelong partisan 
politician, was always opposed to slavery, 
and that he " directed affairs for the ben- 
efit of the nation, through the name of 
another." It is unnecessar3% after what 
has already been said, to comment on this 
assumed direction by a subordinate in- 
stead of the chief, or on the gross injus- 
tice to Mr. Lincoln ; but it should be 
known that the Secretary of State neither 
originated nor directed the affairs of the 
Government on the great measure of eman- 



in error, or its confidence misplaced, when cipation. Mr. Seward was undoubtedly 
it selected and elected liincoln. opposed to slavery, and so was every mem- 
After his election, and after the war ber of the Administration, but his opposi- 
commenced, events forced upon Mr.'l^in- tion never led him to propose any measure 
coin the emancipation of the slaves in the of relief to the country, or to take any 
rebellious States. It was his act, a bold steps against slavery which would be 
step, an executive measure originating likely to impair the Whig party or the 
with him, and was, asstated in the memor- Whig organization while it existe(L No 
able appeal at the close of the final procla- specific act of his — no measure or distinct 
mation, invoking for it the considerate proposition to emancipate the slaves — is 
judginentof mankind, warranted alone by mentioned, for there was none. In the 
military necessity. He and the Cabinet administration of the government he took 
wereaware that the measure involved high no advance step on the slavery question, 
and fearful responsibility, for it Avould Mr. Lincoln was the pioneer and respon- 
alarm the timid everywhere, and alienate, sible author, while the Secretary of State 
at least for a time, the bold in the border studiously avoided aqy expression of opin- 
States. The act itself could not have ion in regard to it. The Secretaries of 
been justified or excused, and would never War and Navy were compelled to act in 
have been attempted, had the country relation to fugitives from slavery who 
been at peace ; yet the movement seemed sought protection under the Union flag — 
aggravated and more hazardous from the an anomalous question — but they could 
fact that the Union was weakened and im- obtain no counsel or advice from the Sec- 
perilled by civil war. Results have proved retary of State how to act. He not only 



187:3.] 



MR. LIXCOLX AND Mil. SEWARD. 



803 



avoidi'il giving an oiiiiiioii, but recoin- 
liiendod cliat the Adiuiui-itration siiuuld 
abstain from any decisive stand on tliat 
controverted and embarrassing sui)ject. 

Tiie President, wiio is rei)resented as 
iiK^ompetent for his position, and whose 
mind in 1861, it is said, " had not even 
opened to the crisis," was reluctant to 
maddle with this disturbing element. Yet 
earlier than others he rightly appreciated 
wliat the Government would have to en- 
counter, and was convinced it must be 
taken in hand and disposed of. The mag- 
nitude of the I'ebellion, and the nature of 
the contest, compelled him, after the civil 
war had been carried on lor twelve 
months, to grapple with this formidable 
subject. His first movement, in March, 
1862, was cautious and deliberate, char- 
acterized by great prudence and fore- 
thought, and designed not to alarm the 
friends of the Union by any harsh or of- 
fensive proceeding. It was an ameliorat- 
ed plan fjr the gradual abolition of slav- 
ery by action of the States respectively, 
with cooperation and assistance of the 
General Government. This plan of volun- 
tary and compensated emancipation vras 
pressed upon Congress and tlie border 
slave States, with great earnestness, by 
the President. Mr. Blair and Mr. Bates, 
both residents of the border slave States, 
were the only members of the Cabinet 
who cordially seconded these first early 
measures in the cause of emancipation. 
Their associates cheerfully assented to 
and acquiesced in the proposition, but 
had neither faitii nor zeal in its success ; 
nor did Mr. Seward or any one of them 
suggest a different or more available plan 
for national relief. The subject was beset 
on every side with difficulty, requiring 
for its manipulation and disposition the 
highest order of administrative and exec- 
utive ability'. No one more than the 
President was impressed with the difficul- 
ties to be met, and at the same time with 
the imperative necessity of decisive ac- 
tion. The details of these proceedings, 
and tlie final determined stand taken by 
him — not by the Secretary of State or any 
of the Cabinet — to decree by an executive 
order the emancipntion of tlie slaves in 
the rebellious States, have been elsewhere 
related. It was after all effirts for vol- 
untary emancipation by the States inter- 
ested, with pecuniary aid from tlie nation- 
al treasury, had failed. To Mr. Seward 



and iiiysclC the President communicated 
his purpose, and asked our views, on the 
13th of July, 1862. It was the day suc- 
ceeding his last unsuccessful and lio})eles3 
conference with the representatives in 
Congress from the border slave States, at 
a gloomy {)eriod of our afi'iirs, just after 
the reverses of our armies under ^IcClcl- 
lan before Richmond. The time, he said, 
had arrived when we must determine 
whether the slave element should be for 
or against us. ^Ir. Seward, represented 
as a superior in " native intellectual pow- 
er," and as having forty years previously 
chosen his side, and as at that early period 
having claimed " aright in the government 
to emancipate slaves," was appalled and 
not prepared for this decisive step, when 
jNIr. Lincoln made known to us his inten- 
tion, by an executive order, to emancipate 
the slaves. Startled with so broad and 
radical a proposition, he informed the 
President that the consequences of such 
an act were so momentous that he was not 
prepared to advise on the subject without 
further reflection. While Mr. Seward 
hesitated, and had the subject under con- 
sideration, the President deliberately pre- 
pared his preliminary proclama tion, which 
met the approval, or at least the acqui- 
escence, of the whole Cabinet, though 
there were phases of opinion not entirely 
in accord with the proceeding. Mr. 
Blair, an original emancipationist, and 
committed to the principle, thought the 
time to issue the order in()i>portune, and 
Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of 
the colored race should be coincident with 
emancipation. Aware that there were 
shades ol'difference amcmg iiis counsellors, 
and hesitation and doubt with some in 
view of the vast responsibility and its cim- 
sequences, the President devised his own 
scheme, held himself alone accountable 
for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, 
prepared eacli of the proclamations of 
freedom. Mr. Seward in no way or form 
originated or was responsible for that 
important measure, did not in any way 
"direct affairs" in regard to it, was in 
no other way cognizant of it beyond his 
colleagues except as communicated to 
him and myself on tiie 13th of July, at its 
inception. Yetinthe" Memorial Address " 
Mr. Seward is represented as the lifelong 
leading opponent of slavery, beyond others 
tlie masterspirit in the Lincoln Adminis- 
tration. The President and tiiis great 



804 



MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 



[Dec. 



event are ignored, and the inference is 
intended to be conveyed that the Secreta- 
ry uf State, who " chose his side " in the 
morning of life adverse to slavery, is ea- 
t*tled to the credit ; for it is represented 
that the President was a mere secondary 
personage, and the Secretary of State di- 
rected affairs in tlie name of Mr. Lincoln, 
who was to " reap the honors due chiefly 
to Mr. Seward's labors." 

To unfold the leaves of suppressed his- 
tory, and correct the errors and perver- 
sions which interested — and many of them 
still living — persons have spread abroad 
and inculcated, is a thankless task, and 
will subject him who performs it to par- 
tisan abuse. It is scarcely to be expected 
that the present generation will know or 
be able to appreciate the labors and acts 
of those who, intrusted with the govern- 
ment in a trying period, took upon them- 
selves immense and unprecedented re- 
sponsibilities, or that a rightful discrim- 
ination will at this early day, if ever, be 
made as regards those who participated 
in the movements which eventuated in 
the salvation of the Union and the eman- 
cipation of a race. The late labored ef- 
fjrt of the distinguished gentleman of an 
historic family and name to depreciate 
the talents and services of Abraham Lin- 
coln, and to crown another with honors 
that justly belong to him, is a specimen 
of lamentable partisan prejudice and 
error. It is but one and perhaps the last 
of many attempts of a similar cliaracter, 
to take from the brow of Lincoln the 
wreath of merit that is justly his — to de- 
prive him of the reward due for his labor, 
and give to another credit for his acts. 
It is not the first time in our history 
when like injustice has been witnessed 
toward our Chief Magistrates. Volumes 
have been Avritten to prove that Hamilton 
controlled Washington and directed the 
affairs of the nation in tlie name of iiis 
chief. Van Buren, it was claimed, con- 
trolled the imperious will of Jackson and 
dictated his measures. Undoubtedly each 
had influence with his chief, perhaps more 
than he deserved. The same may be said 
of Mr. Seward, who had undeniably influ- 
ence with Mr. Lincoln, but who was no 
more the directing mind of the Adminis- 
tration of Lincoln, but really much less, 
than was Hamilton of Washington or Van 



Buren of Jackson. Both Hamilton and 
Seward are .charged with having given 
countenance to this false impres^ijn, 
which, however, redounds to llie credit 
of neitlier. 

In tliese papers, written to correct the 
misconceptions of Mr. Adams, and mi-;- 
representationsof the Albany " Memorial 
Address," incidents of what occurred 
would, I thought, better than merecontrar- 
dictory assertions, illustrate the acts, the 
executive management and administrative 
ability, as well as the capacity and men- 
tal energy, of the men whoso traits are in- . 
volved in the statements which have been 
made. 

Of the incidents that took place during 
the administration of Mr. Lincoln, some 
of which and the attending circumstances 
could not have been disclosed at the time 
of their occurrence, there are in most 
cases living witnesses. The transactions 
of an earlier date are of public notoriety 
and matters of record, commencing with 
the organized anti-masonic proscription, 
and embracing the rise and fall of that 
and subsequent parties, down to and in- 
cluding the much misrepresented pro- 
ceedings at the Chicago Convention in 
1860. 

It has been no part of my purpose to 
magnify or overstate the qualities or 
to give undue credit to the labors and 
abilities of Mr. Lincoln, still less to do in- 
justice to ^Ir. Seward, who is represented 
in the " Memorial Address " as overshad- 
owing his chief. Mr. Lincoln was in many 
■ respects a remarkable, though I do not 
mean to say an infallible man. No true 
delineation or photograph of his intellect- 
ual capacity and attributes has ever been 
given, nor shall I attempt it. His vigoi'- 
ous and rugged but comprehensive mind, 
his keen and shrewd sagacity, his intel- 
lectual strength and mental power, his 
genial, kindly temperament, with charity 
for all and malice toward none — his sin- 
cerity, unquestioned honesty, and homely 
suavity, made him popular as well as 
great. Had he survived to this day, the 
Albany" jNIemorial Address " would have 
been of a different character, and its pages 
not marred with paragraphs wliich retieet 
on his ability and do injustice to his mem- 
ory. 

Gideon Welles. 



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